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Summary. Traditionally, statistical and causal inference on human subjects relies on the as-
sumption that individuals are independently affected by treatments or exposures. However,
recently there has been increasing interest in settings, such as social networks, where treat-
ments may spill over from the treated individual to his or her social contacts and outcomes
may be contagious. Existing models proposed for causal inference using observational data
from networks have two major shortcomings. First, they often require a level of granularity in
the data that is not often practically infeasible to collect, and second, the models are generally
high-dimensional and often too big to fit to the available data. In this paper we propose and
justify a parsimonious parameterization for social network data with interference and conta-
gion. Our parameterization corresponds to a particular family of graphical models known as
chain graphs. We demonstrate that, in some settings, chain graph models approximate the
observed marginal distribution, which is missing most of the time points from the full data.
We illustrate the use of chain graphs for causal inference about collective decision making in
social networks using data from U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 1994 and 2004.
Keywords: Causal inference, Social networks, Collective behavior, Chain graphs,
Graphical models
1. Introduction
Traditionally, statistical inference on human subjects relies on the assumption that indi-
viduals are independently affected by treatments or exposures. However, recently there
has been increasing interest in settings where treatments ”spill over” from the treated
individual to his or her social contacts, or where outcomes are contagious. Researchers
interested in causal inference have developed methods for interference – when one indi-
vidual’s treatment or exposure affects not only his own outcome but also the outcomes
of his contacts (Aronow and Samii, 2012; Athey et al., 2016; Bowers et al., 2013; Eckles
et al., 2014; Forastiere et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2010; Halloran and Hudgens, 2011; Hong
and Raudenbush, 2006, 2008; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Jagadeesan et al., 2017; Liu
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and Hudgens, 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Ogburn et al., 2014; Rosenbaum, 2007; Rubin, 1990;
Sobel, 2006; Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2012; VanderWeele, 2010). Researchers
interested in social networks have attempted to model the spread of contagious outcomes
across network ties (Christakis and Fowler, 2007, 2008, 2010; Ali and Dwyer, 2009; Ca-
cioppo et al., 2009; Lazer et al., 2010; Rosenquist et al., 2010), but existing methods for
such modeling are either flawed (Cohen-Cole and Fletcher, 2008; Lyons, 2011; Shalizi and
Thomas, 2011) or limited by strong assumptions and burdensome data requirements. One
stumbling block for inference in settings with interference and contagion is dimensionality:
in many settings, if n individuals can interfere with or transmit to one another, all n out-
comes are dependent, resulting in a saturated likelihood with the number of parameters
growing exponentially in n even before treatments and covariates are included. In this
paper we propose a parsimonious parameterization for social network data with contagion
and explore when this new parameterization might be justified. Our parameterization
corresponds to a particular family of graphical models known as chain graphs.
Chain graphs have not previously been used in these settings, with the exception of
Tchetgen et al. (2017), who appealed to their parsimony as a statistical model but did not
describe when they would be expected to approximate the true data generating process.
Lauritzen and Richardson (2002) authored a cautionary paper arguing against the cavalier
use of chain graphs, especially for causal inference, but justified their use when interest
is in some kinds of equilibrium distributions. When the outcome of interest represents
collective behavior or collective decisions across interacting individuals, the outcomes may
in fact be in equilibrium. More commonly, however, the true data-generating process is
more likely to correspond to a directed acyclic graph (DAG) model. DAGs do not share
the limitations of chain graphs and have been used for decades to guide inference and
modeling, especially for causal inference (Pearl, 2000). We show that, in certain settings,
the conditional independences entailed by a chain graph model may approximate those
from a DAG model. Using chain graph models for causal inference with social network
data extends a number of papers that have used undirected graph models, or Markov
random fields, to model social interactions, including the ”sociophysics” literature on Ising
models for collective decision making.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews required concepts, defi-
nitions, and notation pertaining to undirected, directed, and chain graph models; readers
familiar with graphical models may be able to skip this section. In Section 3, we describe
previous work using DAGs for causal inference with social network data and in settings
with contagion and interference, and previous work using undirected graphical models to
study collective problem solving. In Section 4 we propose conditions under which chain
graphs may approximate a true underlying DAG model for social network data, and explain
how chain graphs can be used to analyze data with contagion and interference when DAG
models are intractable. These chain graph models extend previously proposed models for
collective problem solving in important and useful ways. In Section 5 we analyze data
on Supreme Court decisions in order to illustrate how chain graph models can be used to
estimate causal effects on collective outcomes, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Graphs and Graphical Models
Graphical models use graphs–collections of vertices, representing random variables, and
edges representing relations between pairs of vertices–to concisely represent conditional
independences that hold among the random variables. At their most general, the graphical
models we will consider in this paper are represented by mixed graphs containing directed
(→), and undirected (−) edges, such that at most one edge connects two vertices. In this
section we review necessary concepts and terminology.
A sequence of non-repeating vertices (V1, . . . , Vk) is called a path if for every i =
1, . . . , k − 1, Vi and Vi+1 are connected by an edge. A path is partially directed if there
exists an ordering of the vertices such that all directed edges in the path point towards the
vertex with a larger index. A partially directed path is directed if it contains no undirected
edges. A mixed graph is contains a partially directed cycle if it contains a partially directed
path with a directed edge from the last to the first node in the path. A mixed graph with
no partially directed cycles is called a chain graph (CG). A chain graph without undirected
edges is called a directed acyclic graph (DAG), and a chain graph without directed edges
is an undirected graph (UG).
If an edge A→ B exists in a graph G, A is a parent of B, and B is a child of A. If an
edge A − B exists in G, then A is a neighbor of B (and vice versa). The sets of parents
and children of A in G are denoted by paG(A) and chG(A), respectively. We define these
sets on sets of vertices disjunctively, e.g. for a set of vertices A, paG(A) ≡
⋃
A∈A paG(A).
Consider an edge subgraph of a CG G that drops all directed edges and retains undi-
rected edges. A connected component in such a subgraph is called a block. The set of
blocks in a CG G will be denoted by B(G). This set partitions the set of vertices in G. In
an undirected graph G, a clique is a maximal fully connected set of vertices. Let the set
of cliques in the edge subgraph be C(G). Note that unlike B(G), C(G) is not necessarily a
partition of vertices in G.
Graphical models encode conditional independences that hold in p(V), the joint dis-
tribution of the random variables corresponding to the vertices of the graph. When a
conditional independence holds, it tells us something about how p(V) can be factorized,
informing choices of models for p(V). In the next sections, we describe results that trans-
late the conditional independences encoded in a graphical model into a factorization of
p(V), and describe models for p(V) that are consistent with the factorization. Any joint
density that can be written according to that factorization will be consistent with the
graphical model.
2.1. Directed acyclic graph models and causal inference
Given DAG G, a DAG model is a set of distributions p(V) that satisfy the following Markov
factorization:
p(V = v) =
∏
V ∈V
p(V | paG(V )). (1)
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(a)
V1 V2
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A
C
Y
(c)
Fig. 1. (a) A simple undirected graph. (b) The simplest chain graph with an independence model
not representable as either a DAG or an undirected graph. (c) A causal graph representing ob-
served confounding of the treatment A and outcome Y by a set of covariates C.
That is, the joint distribution of V is given by the product of the conditional distributions
of each node given its parents. Each conditional distribution can be modeled directly to
get parsimonious models for joint distributions over DAGs.
If a path in a DAG includes X, W and Z and if there are arrows from both X and Z
into W , then W is a collider on the path. A path can be unblocked, meaning roughly that
information can flow from one end to the other, or blocked, meaning roughly that the flow of
information is interrupted at some point along the path. If all paths between two variables
are blocked, then the variables are d-separated, and if two variables are d-separated then
they are statistically independent. A path is blocked if there is a collider on the path such
that neither the collider itself nor any of its descendants is conditioned on. An unblocked
path can be blocked by conditioning on any noncollider along the path. Two variables are
d-separated by a set of variables if conditioning on the variables in the set suffices to block
all paths between them, and if two variables are d-separated by a third variable or a set
of variables then they are independent conditional on the third variable or set of variables
(Pearl, 2000).
DAGs are powerful tools for causal inference using observational data and have gained
widespread use in epidemiology, social sciences, and other fields, because they can be used
to determine whether and how a counterfactual quantity can be identified from observed
data. A primary object of interest in causal inference is a counterfactual or potential
outcome Y (a), which is a random variable representing the outcome, Y , that would have
been observed if, possibly contrary to fact, an exposure or treatment A had been set to
a. For a binary treatment, causal effects of A on Y can be expressed as contrasts between
E[Y (1)] and E[Y (0)].
Inferences about counterfactuals are possible under assumptions linking the distribu-
tion p(V), with {Y,A} ⊆ V, representing factual data we observe, and the counterfactual
distributions p(Y (a)) for any a in the support of A. The consistency assumption states
that if the event A = a is observed, then Y (a) = Y . In other words, the response Y does
not distinguish between counterfactual assignment and factual occurrence of any value a.
In the case of binary A, consistency entails that we observe one of the two counterfactual
responses Yi(1), Yi(0) for every unit i. The specific response we obtain corresponds to ac-
tually observed value of Ai (treatment for that unit). Consistency on its own is insufficient
to make inferences about the ACE, as it gives us only half of the relevant information.The
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assumption of conditional ignorability (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), or no unmeasured
confounders, states that A ⊥⊥ {Y (1), Y (0)} | C, for a set of observed variables C. Condi-
tional ignorability is meant to represent the situation where A is not randomized and the
treatment assignment process and the outcomes are confounded, but all sources of con-
founding are observed and contained in C. Under this assumption, we have the following
derivation:
p(Y (a)) =
∑
C
p(Y (a) | C)p(C) =
∑
C
p(Y (a) | A = a,C)p(C) =
∑
C
p(Y | a,C)p(C).
This is sometimes known as the adjustment formula or backdoor formula.
A DAG is called a causal DAG if it includes all common parents of any node in the
graph. Whether conditional ignorability holds for a particular treatment-outcome relation
can be read off of a causal DAG via the backdoor criterion (see Pearl (2000)): if all of
the paths from the treatment to the outcome that begin with an arrow pointing into
treatment can be blocked by observed covariates, then conditional ignorability holds. As
a simple example, a setting where conditional ignorability hold are represented by a DAG
in Figure 1 (c). The directed arrows in such graphs can be interpreted informally to mean
direct causation (see e.g. (Richardson and Robins, 2013) for a precise interpretation). In
Figure 1 (c), C acts as an observed common cause of A and Y , and therefore any observed
association between A and Y could be due to either the causal relationship of A and Y ,
represented by a directed edge between them, or to the non-causal dependence induced by
C.
The g-formula (Robins, 1986) generalizes the adjustment formula to describe the rela-
tionship between the observed data distribution p(V) and distributions of counterfactual
random variables of the form {V \A}(a) ≡ {V (a)|V ∈ V A}. The intervention operation
that sets a variable A to a can be viewed as replacing the distribution p(A | paG(A)) by
a deterministic distribution p(A = a) = 1, and all distributions {p(V | paG(V )} by distri-
butions {p(V | paG(V ) \ {A}, a)} for V ∈ chG(V ). Generalizing this reasoning to a set of
variables A being intervened on to attain a set of values a results in the g-formula:
p ({V \A} (a) = v) =
∏
V ∈V\A
p(V = v | paG(V ) \A,aA∩paG(V )) (2)
where aA∩paG(V ) denotes the intervention values for the subset of A that intersects with
the parents of V .
Typically in causal inference applications, we are interested in the counterfactual re-
sponse of a single outcome variable Y ∈ V \A to an intervention that sets A to a, which
can easily be obtained from the g-formula, especially for a low dimensional outcome Y .
But in settings with complex networks of outcomes, e.g. representing systems of agents
interacting with one another, statistical inference about the g-formula is impractical or
impossible, and other tools are needed.
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2.2. Undirected graph and chain graph models
Given an undirected graph G, an undirected graphical model is a set of distributions p(V)
that satisfy the global Markov property (Lauritzen, 1996): each node is independent of its
non-neighbors conditional on its neighbors. That gives the following clique factorization:
p(V) =
1
Z
∏
C∈C(G)
φC(C). (3)
Any undirected graphical models can be written as a log-linear model, with a term for each
clique in the factorization:
p(V = v) =
1
Z
exp
 ∑
C∈C(G)
log φC(vC)
 , (4)
where Z is a normalizing constant. This form implies conditional independence constraints
on p(V) via the global Markov property on G.
For example, the factorization for the grid graph in Figure 1 (a) can be re-expressed as
p(V = (v1, v2, v3, v4)) =
1
Z
φ1,2(v1, v2)φ2,3(v2, v3)φ3,4(v3, v4)φ1,4(v1, v4)
=
1
Z
exp {log φ1,2(v1, v2) + log φ2,3(v2, v3) + log φ3,4(v3, v4) + log φ1,4(v1, v4)}
=
1
Z
exp {h1v1 + h2v2 + h3v3 + h4v4 + k1,2v1v2 + k2,3v2v3 + k3,4v3v4 + k1,4v1v4} ,
where without lack of generality we can assign hivi to any log φij . Conditional independence
constraints V1 ⊥⊥ V3 | V2, V4 and V2 ⊥⊥ V4 | V1, V3 hold in any p(v1, v2, v3, v4) with the above
factorization.
Chain graphs allow both directed and undirected edges, and can be used to define hybrid
graphical models combining features of both undirected graphs and DAGs (Lauritzen,
1996). Given a chain graph G with a vertex set V, we say a distribution p(V) is in the
chain graph model of G, if
p(V = v) =
∏
B∈B(G)
p(B | paG(B)), (5)
where each factor p(B | paG(B)) further factorizes as
p(B | paG(B)) = 1
Z(paG(B))
 ∏
C∈C((GfaG(B))a),C 6⊆paG(B)
φC(vC)
 , (6)
Z(vpaG(B)) is a mapping from values of paG(B) to appropriate normalizing constants,
(GfaG(B))a is an undirected graph consisting of vertices in faG(B) ≡ B ∪ paG(B), and
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an undirected edge between any pair in faG(B) adjacent in G or any pair in paG(B).
The chain graph factorization can be viewed as a two-level factorization. The outer
factorization (5) resembles the Markov factorization for DAG models (1) (Pearl, 1988),
while the inner factorization (6) for each outer factor p(B | paG(B)) resembles the undi-
rected factorization (3). The chain graph factorization of p(V) induces a set of conditional
independences on p(V) via a global Markov property just as was the case for undirected
models, although this property is more involved to define (see Lauritzen (1996) for details).
For example, the chain graph in Figure 1 (b) has the factorization
p(v1, v2, a1, a2) =
(
1
Z(a1, a2)
exp {φv1,v2(v1, v2)φv1,a1(v1, a1)φv2,a2(v2, a2)}
)
p(a1)p(a2).
and implies that the conditional independences V1 ⊥⊥ A2 | A1, V2 and V2 ⊥⊥ A1 | A2, V1
hold in p(v1, v2, a1, a2).
Undirected and chain graph models have a deceptively intuitive appeal for modeling
social network data. At first glance the global Markov property seems like a reasonable
way to impose statistical structure on the ties in a social network: it implies that each node
is ”screened off” from its non-neighbors given its neighbors, which sounds consistent with
a process of influence where each node can only affect its neighbors and any longer range
dependence is mediated by paths from one node, through its neighbors, to the broader
network. However, undirected edges are not consistent with the causal influence of one in-
dividual on another. Indeed, Lauritzen and Richardson (2002) argue that many seemingly
intuitive uses for the undirected edges in undirected and chain graphs are in fact mis-
guided. Undirected edges have been used to represent symmetric associations, non-causal
associations, simultaneous responses, processes with feedback, ignorance of the direction of
arrow between two nodes, and causal relations that can change directions, but all of these
are inconsistent with chain graph models. Importantly, they argue that there are no chain
graph models consistent with most DAG models: these two classes of models represent
largely non-overlapping classes of joint distributions. Even projecting a DAG model onto
a subset of variables in the model cannot generally result in a chain graph model. Instead,
the undirected edges in chain graphs represent certain kinds of equilibria, some examples
of which are described in Lauritzen and Richardson (2002).
2.2.1. Causal chain graph models
Part of the appeal–if deceptive–of a chain graph is that if the undirected component rep-
resents outcomes associated with nodes in a social network, nodes with directed edges can
represent treatments or exposures associated with those nodes. Although the incompati-
bility of DAGs and chain graphs make it difficult to give the directed edges in chain graphs
a causal interpretation, Lauritzen and Richardson (2002) proposed a definition of causal
inputs into the equilibria represented by undirected edges.
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Given a CG G, assume the existence of a set of conditional distributions
{p(B | B \ {B}, paG(B))|B ∈ B ∈ B(G)} . (7)
If these sets are chosen appropriately, a single draw from a joint distribution p(V) in
the model of G can be obtained as follows. First, elements of B(G) are given an order-
ing that preserves the temporal ordering of the variables they represent. Next, for each
element B in the order, values b ∈ XB are obtained via a Gibbs sampler that uses ap-
propriate elements of above sets, with values of paG(B) obtained from applications of
a Gibbs sampler to blocks earlier in the ordering. If a block contains a single element
B = {B}, Gibbs sampling can be dispensed with, and a sample from p(B | paG(B))
can be drawn directly. For instance, given the CG G in Figure 1 (b), a sample from
p(A1, A2, V1, V2) that lies in the model of G can be obtained by first ordering the blocks in
G, e.g. {A1} ≺ {A2} ≺ {V1, V2}, then drawing samples a1, a2 directly from p(A1), p(A2),
and finally drawing a sample v1, v2 using a Gibbs sampler with conditional distributions
{p(V1 | V2, a1), p(V2 | V1, a2)} with the values sampled earlier plugged in. Under an appro-
priate choice of {p(B | B \ {B}, paG(B))|B ∈ B ∈ B(G)}, the resulting draw a1, a2, v1, v2 is
from a distribution that lies in the model of G.
This sequential Gibbs sampling algorithm can be repeated even if individual elements
in {p(B | B \ {B}, paG(B))|B ∈ B ∈ B(G)} are replaced by constants, which represents in-
terventions on corresponding variables. The resulting draw is then from an interventional
distribution. For example, if we replace the distribution p(A1) by a constant a1 in Fig-
ure 1 (b), the same algorithm gives a draw from a distribution that can be viewed as
p({V1, V2, A2}(a1)) = p(V1(a1), V2(a1), A2(a1)).
In this paper, we will restrict ourselves to chain graphs with a single non-trivial undi-
rected component or block Y, representing outcomes associated with nodes in a network.
All other variables V \Y will be singleton blocks–that is individual nodes with directed
arrows into nodes in the undirected component. Furthermore, we will only consider inter-
ventions on subsets of V \ Y and not on nodes in the undirected component. For such
interventions, the proposal above immediately implies the following generalization of the
g-formula: Given a collection of variables A ⊆ V \Y, the effect of intervening to set A to
a on the rest of the variables in the chain graph model is given by
p({V \A}(a) = v) = p(Y | paG(Y) \A,apaG(Y)∩A)
 ∏
W∈V\Y
p(W | paG(W ) \A,apaG(W ))
 ,
(8)
where
p(Y | paG(Y) \A,apaG(Y)∩A) =
∏
C∈C((GfaG(Y))a),C6⊆paG(Y) φC(C \A,aC∩A)
Z(paG(Y) \A,apaG(Y)∩A)
.
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In Figure 1 (b), this implies that the effect of an intervention on A1 is given by
p(V1(a1) = v1, V2(a1) = v2, A2(a1) = a2) = p(a2)
φV1,V2(v1, v2)φA1,V1(a1, v1)φA2,V2(a2, v2)
Z(a1, a2)
.
Of course, this can only give the true distribution of the outcomes under an intervention
if a Gibbs sampler chain graph model is the true data-generating model. This will not be
the case unless the outcomes are in a very specific kind of equilibrium with one another,
but we will argue below that causal chain graphs may usefully approximate the truth in
some settings. First, in the next section, we review the ways that graphical models have
been used to model social interactions in the existing literature.
3. History of graphical models for social interactions
Causal DAG models, or the mathematically equivalent causal structural equation models,
are assumed either implicitly or explicitly in almost all existing methods for learning about
social interactions, interference, and contagion from observational data. DAGs and causal
structural equation models correspond to a mechanistic view of the (macroscopic) world,
which is espoused by most researchers across many disciplines. In particular, almost all
approaches to learning about causal effects from data assume are based on this mechanistic
view of the world. The impact that one individual has on another is a causal effect, and
therefore most of the literature on social influence makes use of causal ideas, terminology,
and methods (though sometimes not overtly).
Ogburn et al. (2014) is an overview of the use of DAGs to represent interference and
contagion. New methods for learning about spillover and contagion effects from social
network data similarly rely on assumptions that are consistent with DAG models but not
with CG models, explicitly in the case of methods for observational data proposed by
van der Laan (2014) and Ogburn et al. (2017) and implicitly in many of the methods based
on randomized experiments (e.g. Aronow and Samii, 2012; Athey et al., 2016; Bowers
et al., 2013; Choi, 2014; Eckles et al., 2014; Forastiere et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2010;
Hong and Raudenbush, 2006, 2008; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Jagadeesan et al., 2017;
Liu and Hudgens, 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Rosenbaum, 2007; Rubin, 1990; Sobel, 2006;
Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2012; VanderWeele, 2010). However, as we will
show in the next section and as has been acknowledged by some of the aforementioned
researchers, DAGs in these settings can quickly become cumbersome.
Although much of the literature social interactions makes use of concepts and models
from causal inference, undirected graph models have been used to model human behavior in
many different settings (see, e.g., West et al., 2014; Domingos and Richardson, 2001; Ahmed
and Xing, 2009; Kindermann and Snell, 1980), and a niche literature uses a particular class
of undirected graph models, namely Ising models, to for collective behavior. The Ising
model was originally developed by physicists to model spin-states (up/down) of atoms of
a metal arranged on a lattice (Ising, 1925); it is meant to represent the state of a physical
system at a particular temperature. As temperature decreases but remains strictly greater
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than absolute zero, the system may transition from a relatively disordered state to a state
where most spins are either up or down. Such a phenomenon is called a phase transition.
Phase transitions do not occur for Ising models in a one dimensional lattice, but they occur
in all higher dimensional grids, starting with dimension 2 (Peierls, 1936). A literature has
developed that uses the Ising model to represent not thermal equilibria in physical systems,
but rather the forming of consensus in groups of interacting individuals (Galam et al. 1982;
Galam 1997; Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd 2000; see also Galam, 2008 and references therein),
each holding one of a pair of possible opinions (e.g. for or against a proposition). A phase
transition occurs if individuals converge to a consensus. The rectangular lattice underlying
the model restricts each individual to interacting with a fixed number of other individuals,
depending on the dimension of the lattice. Despite the fact that these models have not been
fit, validated, or tested against real data, sociophysicists have made strong and empirically
verifiable claims about social phenomena (e.g. Galam, 2008).
The Ising model is a special case of a log-linear model defined on an undirected graph,
and therefore the chain graph models we describe (which include undirected graphs as a
special case) generalize Ising models for human behavior to networks, rather than lattices;
facilitate statistical inference and model fitting using real data; introduce the idea of treat-
ments with causal effects on nodes; and clarify the uses and limitations of such models for
human behavior. These chain graph models similarly generalize other undirected graph
models to allow for treatments with causal effects on nodes.
4. When DAGs are intractable but chain graphs may be useful
In contrast to classical causal inference, where treatments and outcomes are independent
across subjects, we are interested in representing and reasoning about situations where out-
comes are complicated and may represent dependent processes across individuals connected
by social ties. Consider a social network of n individuals, or nodes. Node i is associated
with a treatment or exposure, Ai, an outcome Yi, and possibly covariates. For example, Y
could represent opinions and A advertising campaigns; Y could represent behavior and A
encouragement interventions, or Y could represent an infectious disease and A vaccination.
We represent a set of outcomes on individuals in a social network by vertices connected
by undirected edges. In addition, we want to represent causal influences of interventions
on these outcomes, and variables that may serve as confounders for such influences in ob-
served data. Edges involving these variables will be directed, representing causality. When
individual’s beliefs or opinions undergo phase transitions to orderly states, e.g. when there
is external pressure to reach a unanimous consensus, or when it can be argued that the
distribution of individual’s behaviors, beliefs, opinions, or other outcomes attains an equi-
librium across network ties, then a chain graph may be the correct model for the joint
distributions of outcomes across a network and interventions on those outcomes. For ex-
ample, in the Supreme Court data that we analyze below, outcomes represent decisions
made under time constraints and with pressure for the nine justices to reach a unanimous
decision; these may indeed be in equilibrium. More common in the existing literature are
settings in which DAG models would be the most appropriate but are not tractable given
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reasonable constraints on data collection.
We make the routine assumption that interference can occur only directly between two
individuals who share a tie in the underlying social network. That is, any effect of an ego’s
treatment on a non-alter’s outcome must be mediated by mutual connections. Figure 2 (a)
depicts one of the simplest such settings: the network is comprised of only three individuals;
individuals 1 and 2 share a tie and 2 and 3 share a tie; each individual’s outcome is affected
by her own treatment, her own past outcomes, and her social contacts’ past outcomes. In
order for this DAG to be valid, the units of time captured must be small enough that any
influence passing from 1 to 3 through 2 cannot occur in fewer than 2 time steps (Ogburn
et al., 2014). This will be the case if influence can only occur during discrete interactions
such as in-person or online encounters, and the unit of time is chosen to be the minimum
time between encounters. This DAG model encodes several conditional independences,
and if we are able to observe the outcome for all agents at all time steps, inference under
these models may be possible (Ogburn et al., 2017).
However, in most practical applications, with the exception of online social networks, it
is only be possible to observe the outcome at one or a few time points. If data are generated
according to the DAG in Figure 2 (a) but the outcome is observed at only one time point
(at which the outcome is not in a chain graph equilibrium), then the resulting model is
represented by a mixed graph representing the latent projection of all of the variables in
Figure 2 (a) onto the subset of those variables that are actually observed, with bidirected
edges representing the presence of one or more hidden common causes (Spirtes and Verma,
1992). A general construction algorithm for these latent projection mixed graphs is given
by Pearl (2009), and the result for Figure 2 (a) is shown in Figure 2 (b).
Collecting or accessing the detailed temporal data required to use the models like Figure
2 (a) is often impractical or impossible, but the saturated model for the marginal in Figure
2 (b) quickly becomes unwieldy, as the number of parameters required to estimate and use
the model grows exponentially with the number of nodes: the latent projection graph will
generally not be sparse, even if the underlying social network governing opinion formation
is. To see this, note that after a single time step, an individual only influences neighboring
individuals, but after two time steps, also neighbors of neighbors. In the three-person
network represented by Figure 2, this is enough to render the latent projection of Fig 2 (b)
fully saturated, with no conditional independences. After many time steps, the individual’s
influence would have time to reach most of the social network. This implies that any two
outcomes at time t, for a large enough t, will be related via a chain of hidden common
causes, even if the corresponding individuals are far from each other in the social network.
To represent these chains of hidden common causes, the latent projection graph would
contain a clique of bidirected edges encompassing opinions of everyone in the network. The
significance of a non-sparse latent projection is that the corresponding statistical model is
has exponentially many parameters, even if all variables are binary. These limitations are
reflected in the literature, which rarely includes applications to real data.
Unlike the model in Figure 2 (b), the chain graph model represented by Figure 2 (c) is
not saturated. In certain cases, a chain graph model that is as sparse as the underlying
social network may serve as a good approximation of the intractable latent projection
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(c)
Fig. 2. (a) Causal DAG representing opinion formation among peers. Ai represents interventions
meant to influence subject i, Y ki is the ith subject’s opinion at time k. (b) A latent projection of
the model in (a) onto variables A1, A2, A3, Y T1 , Y T2 , Y T3 , representing the distribution of opinion in
(a) at time T , before equilibrium is reached. The red bidirected arrows represent the fact that the
outcomes at intermediate time points are unmeasured common causes of the observed outcomes.
(c) A chain graph model that approximates the distribution of opinion in (a) at time T under certain
data generating processes.
model.
Consider chain graph models like the one in corresponding to Figure 2 (c), but with
arbitrary undirected components corresponding to outcomes observed on social network
nodes. These models imply that each node’s outcome is independent of its non-neighbors’
outcomes conditional on its neighbors’ outcomes and on any treatments or covariates with
arrows pointing into the node. For chain graphs like Figure 2 (c), with a single treat-
ment for each node, the conditional independences implied by the graph are of the form
Y Ti ⊥⊥Aj , Y tj | Ai,
{
Y Tl ,∀l adjacent to i
}
. These conditional independences fail to hold in
the corresponding DAG models due to two different types of paths, depicted in red in
Figure 3.
Paths like the one in Figure 3 (a) represent the fact that the past outcomes of mutual
connections affect both Y Ti and Y
T
j ; this is just one of many such paths. All of these
paths can be blocked by conditioning on
{
Y tl , for all l adjacent to i and for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1
}
(Ogburn and VanderWeele, 2017). If the outcome evolves slowly over time, Y tl and Y
T
l will
be highly correlated and conditioning on
{
Y Tl , for all l adjacent to i
}
will mostly block
these paths. We expect the paths through Y tl to be weaker for smaller t than for t close
to T . If paths through Y tl are weaker for earlier times t, then the relationship between Y
t
l
and Y Tl can also weaken for decreasing t – as long as it remains strong enough to allow
conditioning on Y Tl to approximately block paths through Y
t
l .
However, conditioning on
{
Y Tl , for all l adjacent to i
}
opens paths through colliders,
like the one depicted in Figure 3 (b). M-shaped collider paths like these are known to
induce weak dependence in general (Greenland, 2003), and the magnitude can be bounded
more precisely using knowledge of the partial correlation structure of the variables along
the path (Chaudhuri and Richardson, 2002). Informally, if the dependence of Y Tl on Y
T−1
l
is stronger than that of Y Tl on Y
T−1
i and Y
T−1
j , as it will be if the outcome evolves slowly
over time, then the dependence induced by paths through colliders may be negligible.
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Fig. 3. Paths that connect Y T1 and Y T3 even when conditioning on Y T2 and A1 and/or A3. Boxes
indicate variables that are conditioned on.
Although chain graph models exist in which the relationships along undirected edges
are not symmetric, we found in simulations that DAGs with symmetric relationships for
connected pairs of individuals were better approximated by chain graphs. It might be
reasonable to assume this kind of symmetry if, for example, the outcome is a behavior or
belief and the subjects are peers with no imbalance of power or influence, or if the outcome
is an infectious disease and the subjects have similar underlying health and susceptibility
statuses.
We verified these claims in simulated data. We simulated ten random nine-node so-
cial networks with edge probability p = 0.3 for every pair of nodes. For each random
network, we generated outcomes for the nodes 1000 times according to a DAG model
like the one in Figure 2 (a), with symmetric causal effects for every edge in the un-
derlying network. For all nonadjacent pairs (i, j), we tested (1) the null hypothesis
of marginal independence Y ti ⊥⊥Y tm, (2) the null hypothesis of conditional independence
Y ti ⊥⊥Y tm |
{
Y tl , ∀l adjacent to i
}
, and (3) the null hypothesis of conditional independence
Y ti ⊥⊥Y tm | Ai,
{
Y tl , ∀l adjacent to i
}
. We found that the conditional independence nulls
were rejected at close to the nominal rate of 5% expected under the null. In contrast,
the marginal independence null was rejected more frequently, suggesting that conditioning
on neighbors’ outcomes may recover approximate independence under at least some data
generating processes, and that the chain graph model may in those cases be a reasonable
parsimonious approximation to the true underlying conditional independences. In another
set of simulations with three agents we found that a chain graph model was able to ap-
proximately estimate causal effects from data generated under a DAG model. For details
see the Supplementary Materials.
In the next section we illustrate the use of chain graph models for causal inference about
social interactions in simulations and in real data on U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
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5. Using chain graph models to analyze U.S. Supreme Court decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court is comprised of nine justices, one of whom is the Chief Justice,
tasked with presiding over oral arguments, serving as the spokesperson for the court, and
other administrative roles. After a case is heard by the Supreme Court, the justices discuss
and decide the case over a period of several weeks or months. The final outcome is decided
by majority vote; the majority and, when the decision is not unanimous, the minority write
opinions justifying their decisions. The oral and written arguments presented to the court
and the judicial opinions are public resources; however, we have no access to the debates
and discussions that lead the justices to their decisions. This precludes the use of a DAG
model for the evolution of individuals’ opinions over time, but is amenable to a chain graph
model with Yi defined as Justice i’s final opinion.
Data on all Supreme Court decisions since 1946, along with rich information on the
nature of the cases and the opinions, is maintained by Washington University Law School’s
Supreme Court Database (http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php). We used the subset of
these data corresponding to the Second Rehnquist Court, a period of ten years (1994-
2004) during which the same nine justices served together: William Rehnquist (Chief
Justice), John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy,
David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Over these
ten years the court decided 893 cases.
The Supreme Court Database has classified each case into one of 14 issue areas, such as
criminal procedure and civil rights. We examined the effect of issue area on conservative
vs. liberal opinions. For each case, each justice has an outcome, Y , which is an indicator
of a liberal opinion. The ruling in the case is liberal if at least 5 of the justices form liberal
opinions and conservative otherwise. During the Rehnquist court, 56% of the decisions were
conservative. Clarence Thomas was the most conservative justice, signing the conservative
opinion in 72% of cases, while Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the most liberal, signing the liberal
opinion in 60% of cases. However, we found that issue area had a strong effect on both
individual outcomes and on overall court decisions, which is consistent with literature on
the effect of issue areas on the ideology of each justice or on the final decision of Supreme
Court (Tate, 1981; Lu and Wang, 2011).
We will separately consider the effects of indicators of (i) criminal procedure, (ii) civil
rights, (iii) economic activity, and (iv) judicial power on conservative vs liberal opinions.
Although there is strong evidence (including self-report by the justices) that the Court
works hard to come to unanimous decisions, 5-to-4 decisions are frequent (Sunstein, 2014;
Riggs, 1992). There is also considerable academic interest in each justice’s personal orien-
tation (Songer and Lindquist, 1996; Tate, 1981). A chain graph model can answer causal
questions such as: do any of the issue areas cause a significantly greater probability of
unanimous decisions relative to the other areas?
First, we fit a log-linear model with all pairwise interaction terms in order to estimate
the social network by which justices influence one another, with undirected edges between
justices given by the magnitude of their interaction coefficient. (This ad-hoc method per-
formed as well as established structure-learning algorithms in simulations and was easier
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YRehnquist YBreyer
YStevens
YO’Connor
Acase : Judicial Power
YKennedy
YScalia
YSouter
YThomas
YGinsburg
Fig. 4. The underlying network between nine justices assuming the model where the intervention
of A indicates the case is about judicial power. The color of each node indicates well-known
political orientation or political party affiliation – red indicates conservative or from republican party,
and blue indicates liberal or from democratic party, but of course, we do not know the it really is.
The undirected edge between the justices implies the existence of some interactions or feedback
in decision making procedures learned through network structure learning procedure.
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to implement.) We used this estimated network as the undirected component of a chain
graph and added a single treatment variable, i.e. issue area, that jointly affects each jus-
tice’s outcome. The resulting chain graph for the judicial power issue area is displayed in
Figure 4. Informally, there seems to be a liberal (blue) clique and two conservative (red)
cliques: a more moderate one comprised of O’Connor and Kennedy, and a more conserva-
tive one comprised of Scalia and Thomas–with Chief Justice Rehnquist serving as a hub
with connections to almost every other justice (with the exception of Souter). We found
that justices interact with one another not only based on their shared liberal or conser-
vative leanings, but also across that divide. For example, Justices Stevens and Kennedy
are known to have had different judicial philosophies and views, but there is anecdotal
evidence that they often influenced one another’s votes†. The tie between Breyer and
O’Connor could be explained by their social connections‡ or their shared views on judicial
independence§. Thomas and Breyer sat next to each other on the bench and were thought
to have developed a close working relationship as a result¶.
Separately for each of the four issue areas, we estimated the parameters of the following
chain graph model, based on the graph in Figure 4:
p
(
Y = (y1, y2, . . . , y9)|A = a
)
=
1
Z
exp

9∑
i=1
hiyi +
9∑
i,j=1,eij=1
kijyiyj +
9∑
i=1
γiayi
 , (9)
where eij = 1 implies justice i and j share an undirected edge in the chain graph. The
parameter hi represents the conservative or liberal leaning of Justice i, with a positive hi
indicating bias towards liberal opinions, and the interaction parameter kij captures the
tendency of Justices i and j to agree, with a positive kij indicating tendency to agree while
a negative kij indicates tendency to disagree. The parameter γi is related to the causal
effect of issue area a on Justice i’s opinions, with positive γi indicating tendency toward
liberal opinions above and beyond what can be explained by the Justice’s independent
leaning or by the interactions with other Justices. In principle three-way interactions
could be added to the model to capture tendencies of groups of three justices to agree or
disagree beyond what the pairwise interactions explain, but we did not have enough data
to reliably estimate these additional parameters. We bootstrapped the standard errors
in order to calculate 95% confidence intervals, with nb = 500 bootstrap samples for each
model.
Table 1 displays the main effects for each justice across four issue areas. As expected,
Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas tended towards opinions that were more conservative
across all issue areas, while Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg tended towards more liberal
†http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html
‡http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2017/03/supreme-court-shutters-justice-
oconnors-workout-class.html
§http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-july-dec06-independence_09-26/
¶http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/breyer_sometimes_poses_questions_for_
thomas_during_oral_arguments/
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Table 1. Coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals corresponding to personal
orientation {ki : i = 1, 2, . . . , 9} in model 9.
Issue WHRehnquist JPStevens SDOConnor
Criminal procedure -0.29 [-0.54 ,-0.12] 0.48 [0.35 ,0.63] -0.33 [-0.50 ,-0.16]
Civil rights -0.12 [-0.35 ,0.07] 0.51 [0.37 ,0.68] -0.27 [-0.46 ,-0.10]
Economic activity -0.16 [-0.37 ,0.02] 0.33 [0.20 ,0.47] -0.28 [-0.45 ,-0.12]
Judicial power -0.20 [-0.46 ,0.02] 0.26 [0.13 ,0.40] -0.23 [-0.43 ,-0.04]
Issue AScalia AMKennedy DHSouter
Criminal procedure -0.00 [-0.16 ,0.17] -0.12 [-0.28 ,0.04] 0.18 [0.00 ,0.39]
Civil rights -0.02 [-0.19 ,0.15] -0.21 [-0.38 ,-0.03] 0.27 [0.08 ,0.45]
Economic activity -0.00 [-0.17 ,0.18] -0.05 [-0.20 ,0.11] 0.07 [-0.08 ,0.24]
Judicial power -0.13 [-0.32 ,0.08] -0.02 [-0.19 ,0.15] 0.20 [-0.00 ,0.40]
Issue CThomas RBGinsburg SGBreyer
Criminal procedure -0.42 [-0.61 ,-0.25] 0.30 [0.09 ,0.50] 0.03 [-0.15 ,0.23]
Civil rights -0.55 [-0.76 ,-0.37] 0.08 [-0.13 ,0.28] 0.15 [-0.03 ,0.35]
Economic activity -0.29 [-0.46 ,-0.13] 0.31 [0.09 ,0.49] 0.01 [-0.18 ,0.19]
Judicial power -0.28 [-0.49 ,-0.09] 0.14 [-0.09 ,0.33] 0.04 [-0.15 ,0.25]
opinions. The direction of the main effect for Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer depends
on the issue area. In Figure 5 the shade of the node reflects the estimated main effect and
the type and width of the edges reflects the magnitude and sign of the estimated interaction
for A = I(judicial power). The dotted edge connecting Rehnquist and Stevens represents
the only negative interaction. Interestingly, the Rehnquist/Stevens interaction term is
negative (and statistically significant) across all four issue areas. This is corroborated by
anecdotal evidence, as Stevens was reputed to be the most likely to disagree with the other
justices‖ (Sirovich, 2003).
Using the model given in Equation 9, we estimated the causal effects of issue area on the
majority-based decisions of the nine justices. We found that judicial power resulted in the
highest probability of unanimous decisions, with those decisions more likely than baseline
to be conservative (Supporting Material Table 5). Economic activity resulted in a higher
probability of liberal and unanimous decisions than baseline (Supporting Material Table
4). Criminal procedures and civil rights both increased the probability of 4 (liberal)-to-5
(conservative) decisions (Supporting Material Tables 2 and 3).
5.1. Simulations with individual-level treatments
To illustrate how chain graphs can be used to estimate causal effects with individual-level
treatments, we simulated data from the undirected component of the graph in Figure 4
with the addition of individual-level treatments A and individual level covariates C that
are dependent across justices and have direct casual effects on A and Y . Treatment Ai
nudges Justice i towards a liberal decision. We specified baseline main effects and pairwise
interaction terms using estimates from a log-linear model fit to the actual Supreme Court
‖http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html?mcubz=0
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Fig. 5. The color of each node represents the justice’s liberal or conservative bent. The width of
the edges represents the sign and magnitude of the pairwise interaction between the justices.
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data, and then varied the magnitude of the main effects and two-way interaction terms
by controlling the parameters α and β respectively. For each combination of parameter
values, we generated 500 simulated data sets from the chain graph model, each of which
used Gibbs sampling to produce 2000 observations of (Y,A,C). Details of the simulation
are in the Supporting Material.
Figure 6 compares the true counterfactual probabilities of unanimous decisions to their
estimates under two different hypothetical treatment assignments: giving the five most
conservative justices nudges towards liberal decisions or giving the four most liberal justices
nudges towards liberal decisions. We varied the magnitudes of the main effects for each
Justice (controlled by α) and pairwise interactions for connected justices (controlled by β).
Across all scenarios, treating the conservative justices has a greater effect on the probability
of unanimous liberal decisions than does treating the liberal justices. Additional results
are in the Supporting Material.
All the code and accompanying data can be found in https://github.com/youjin1207/
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Fig. 6. The effects of intervening on the 4 liberal or the 5 conservative justices on the probabilities
of unanimous liberal and unanimous conservative decisions. In general, treating the conservative
justices has a greater effect on the probability of unanimous liberal decisions than treating the
liberal justices.
6. Conclusion and next steps
We have described a chain graph model for outcomes associated with nodes in a social
network, with dependence along network ties induced by social interactions, contagion,
or interference. Although our Supreme Court example afforded multiple, ostensibly i.i.d.
observations from the same chain graph, statistical inference for a single realization of a
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large chain graph was developed in Tchetgen et al. (2017). The chain graph model can only
represent the true data-generating distribution if the outcomes are in very specific kinds of
equilibria, which may be plausible if the outcomes represent collective beliefs or decisions
(as in the Supreme Court example) but are often implausible. However, we showed that
data generated from a causal DAG may be well-approximated by a chain graph model,
clarifying the conditions under which it may be reasonable to use of these models in the
literature on Ising models for collective behavior, undirected models for social networks,
and chain graph models for causal inference in social networks. This approximation has
two major limitations: first, it requires that the outcome evolve slowly over time, and
second, it requires that the only source of dependence across nodes in the network be due
to the causal effects from one node’s outcome to another. This rules out latent variable
dependence, where outcomes from nodes that are connected or close in the social network
may be dependent due to shared environment, genetics, or other characteristics Ogburn
et al. (2017); Ogburn (2018). Future work is needed to develop tractable statistical models
that can handle these more general kinds of dependence, and to test these models against
real-world data.
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